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IN THE
SUPREME

COURT

OF THE
STATE

OF UTAH

CECIL 0. ECKARD and
]
MARILYN J. ECKARD, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
I

Case No.

14153

vs.
GALE G. SMITH and
JOY T. SMITH, his wife,

]

Defendants-Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Respondents were originally granted specific performance in December, 1973 by the lower court for the sale of onehalf of a duplex to them, and they received a deed to the subject property from Appellants in January, 1974.

In October,

1974, this Court, in a 3 to 2 decision, reversed the lower
court on the ground that the contract was not sufficiently
definite to allow specific performance.

After remittitur to

the lower court, Appellants moved for restitution of the premises.

Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground

that the issues had been rendered moot by Appellants1 own acts
before and after filing their notice of appeal.
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-2DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Respondent's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the issues were moot
and denied Appellants1 motions for restitution and damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents request this Court to sustain the
summary judgment awarded them by the lower court on May 13,
1975.

.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents state the facts upon which the lower

court based its summary judgment because many of the relevant
facts which show mootness are omitted from Appellants' brief.
The facts are divided into numbered paragraphs for convenience.
1.

After hearing the witnesses and reviewing the

evidence, the lower court in December, 1973 decreed that
Respondents were entitled to specific performance for conveyance of one-half of a duplex and that they had to exercise
their option to purchase within 25 days after judgment.
(R. 109-11).
2.

The lower court's decision does not specify

how the option was to be exercised.

(R. 109) .

In fact,

Appellants set the terms for exercising the option.
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(R. 71).

-33.

The lower court's decision does not require

or even mention a party-wall agreement.
4.

(R. 109).

When the end of the 25 day period was approach-

ing, Respondents asked Appellants for an extension of time
in which to obtain the money to make the purchase, but Appellants refused.

In fact, Appellants insisted that Res-

pondents pay by cash or cashier's check rather than personal
check.

(R. 71)...

(Respondents were unable to obtain a con-

ventional home loan because Appellants refused at that time
to execute a party-wall agreement).
5.

As a result of Appellants' insistence, Res-

pondents were required to secure a loan from a personal friend
and to deliver to Appellants a cashier's check in the amount
of $37,744.02 in full payment for their one-half of the duplex
on Friday, January 4, 1974 because they could not obtain a
cashier's check at any later time to comply with the 25 day
requirement.

(R. 71). This payment occurred six days before

Appellants filed their notice of appeal.
6.

(See R. 107).

In anticipation of the payment, Appellants had

already completed a warranty deed to Respondents on January
3, 1974.

(R. 98-100).
7.

Appellants accepted the said cashier's check

on January 4, 1974 and delivered to Respondents the said
warranty deed signed by Appellants and notarized by their
attorney.

(R. 89, 100).
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-48.

Appellants' attorney also signed a receipt that

the said cashier's check was received "in full and complete
payment for one-half (1/2) of the duplex . . ."

(R. 42;

see R. 89 (Affidavit of Appellant's attorney)).
9.

Both Appellants endorsed the said cashier's

check and voluntarily cashed it several weeks after they had
filed their appeal.
10.

(R. 71; see copy of check R. 40-41).

No Writ of Execution or other supplemental pro-

ceedings were ever instituted by Respondents against Appellants.
11.

At the time of the sale to Respondents, Appel-

lants did not:
(a)

Attempt to stay the sale as provided
in Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure by filing a supersedeas bond;

(b)

Reserve any right or claim under the
litigation;

(c)

Protest the sale; or

(d)

Take any other preventive action.

12.

Appellants did not file their Notice of Appeal

until six days after they had conveyed the property to
Respondents.
13.

(See R. 107).
Almost two weeks after filing their Notice of

Appeal, Appellants executed a party-wall agreement dated
January 22, 1974, which states that the "Eckards [Respondents]
are owners in fee" of one-half of the duplex, and requested
Respondents to sign it.

The said party-wall agreement had

been prepared by Appellants' attorney who notarized their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5signatures.

(R. 43-46; see R. 90).

14.

Respondents did not sign the party-wall agreement

submitted by Appellants because Appellants were then negotiating
to sell the other half of the duplex to the Townsends. (R. 71).
15.

On February 5, 1974 several weeks after filing

their Notice of Appeal, Appellants sold the other half of the
duplex to the Townsends.
16.

(R. 71).

As a condition of the sale to the Townsends,

Appellants required the

Townsends to execute a party-wall

agreement with Respondents on February 5, 1974.

(R. 71-72;

see R. 47-50).
17.

The cashier's check from Respondents to

Appellants was negotiated by Appellants after February 5,
1974.

(R. 71; see R. 40-41).
18.

Because Respondents had declined to execute

the party-wall agreement prepared by Appellants' attorney,
Appellants had, on January 30, 19 74 moved the lower court
for an order setting aside their conveyance to Respondents.
(R. 98). Appellants were then complaining to the lower
court that the basis of their motion to set aside the conveyance was not because they had been forced to convey but
because Respondents had not complied with the judgment!
(R. 101, 98).
19.

After the party-wall agreement between the

Townsends and Respondents was executed, Appellant's attorney
told the lower court on or about February 19, 1974 that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-6matter had been "resolved and settled", and as a result the
lower court denied Appellants' motion to set aside the conveyance to Respondents.

(R. 98, which shows the notation

thereon by Judge Croft? see minute entry, R. 103).
20.

Upon the original appeal the majority of this

Court expressly declined to consider the mootness issue
(R.82) and did not order restitution although empowered to do
so under Rule 76(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The dissent argued that the issues had been mooted. (R. 8283) •
21.

After remittitur and after reviewing the

record and hearing the arguments on mootness the lower court
granted summary judgment to Respondents but inadvertently
signed the wrong summary judgment form.

(See R. 8 ) . The

lower court executed and filed the correct judgment on May
13, 1975.

(R. 28).
A R G U M E N T
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENTS ON
THE ISSUE OF MOOTNESS AND PROPERLY
DENIED APPELLANTS1 MOTIONS FOR RESTITUTION AND DAMAGE.
This Court has held that when a party "acquiesces

in a judgment against him he thereby waives his right to have
said judgment reviewed on appeal."

Ottenheimer, et al v , v.

Mountain States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 Pac.1117, 1118 (1920)
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-7Although the present appeal contests the lower court's dec-*
ision of mootness, the facts of the Ottenheimer case are in
point and the above stated principle is applicable because
the facts upon which mootness is based all occurred prior
to the hearing of the initial appeal.

In Ottenheimer, the

defendant-appellant vacated certain property pursuant to an
order of the lower court but in doing so served a written
notice on respondent stating that it was vacating the property pursuant to the order but was not waiving any of its
claims.

This Court dismissed the appeal in Ottenheimer in

spite of the written notice that the defendant-appellant
was not waiving its claims.
In the instant case, Respondents brought no process
to enforce their judgment, and thus Appellants were not forced
into conveying the property or accepting payment.

In fact,

Appellants set the terms, insisted on a cash payment and
acknowledged that the cashier's check was in "full and complete payment".

Moreover, when payment was made Appellants

indicated no intent to preserve their rights to appeal and took
no action to preserve those rights-they filed no supersedeas
bond, they requested no stay; on the contrary, they demanded
performance within the twenty-five day period set by the court
and refused to accept less than cash in payment.

As is stated

in the Facts, Respondents were forced to take extraordinary
measures to comply with the terms set by Appellants. See
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-8Golden Spike Equipment Co. v. Croshaw, 16 Utah 2d 391, 401
P.2d 949, 951 (1965), wherein this Court indicated that
there should be an evident intention to preserve an appeal
at the time a judgment is satisfied.
Appellants were at all times pertinent hereto represented by counsel who was even asked if he wanted his name
on the check paid to Appellants.

If Appellants wanted to

protect their interests on appeal they could and should
have filed a notice of appeal, requested a stay of the
judgment or filed a supersedeas bond before demanding and
accepting a full cash payment and delivering their deed.
Appellant's actions in the period following judgment both
before and after filing their notice of appeal are an irrevocable waiver of their claims.
On the question of mootness, some courts have
distinguished between acts occurring before appeal and those
occurring after. In our case, Appellants took voluntary
actions contradictory to their position both before and after
filing their notice of appeal.

Such prior or subsequent

actions taken separately should be sufficient to render
Appellants' claims moot.

When such actions are combined,

the issue must be.conclusively moored.

It would be inequitable

indeed if Appellants could set the terms, demand and receive
a cashier's check in full payment for the property in dispute,
voluntarily cash the check several weeks after filing their
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notice of appeal, thereafter tell the lower court that the
issue had been "resolved and settled", and then claim they
are entitled to restitution.
Further, for Appellants' benefit, Respondents
executed a party-wall agreement after the appeal had been
filed so that Appellants could sell the other one-half of the
duplex to the Townsends.

All of Appellants' actions in regard

to the sale to Respondents and the Townsends contradict any
further claims Appellants now assert.

A case becomes moot

when by an act of the parties the controversy has come to an
end.

Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970).

A moot question is one that existed but because of the
happening of certain events has ceased to exist.

Harvey

v, Cahill, 206 N.E.2d 500 (111. App.).
In the instant case, the Affidavit of Appellants'
attorney contained in the file (R. 89) establishes most of
the facts to show mootness.

Moreover, the lower court dis-

missed Appellants' motion to set aside the conveyance to
Respondents because Appellants'

attorney told the lower

court long after the appeal had been filed that the matter
had been "resolved and settled".
After remittitur the question of mootness was placed
directly before the lower court.

Mootness, as grounds for

dismissal, is discussed in 6A Moore's Federal Practice Section
57.13 as follows:
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"I

One or more of the issues involved in an
action may become moot prior to or during
the trial of the action in the lower court.
In this event the trial court should refuse
to make an adjudiciation of the moot issue(s).
If the non-mooted issues that remain are sufficient so that the action itself remains
justiciable then the trial court properly
proceeds to adjudicate those issues; but if
the mooted issues are controlling the trial
court should dismiss the action . . .
Respondents do not contest the right of restitution
in a proper case when process has issued to enforce a sale or
judgment.

See Rule 76 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

How-

ever, the parties in the present case voluntarily entered into
a contract for the "full and complete" payment of cash for

(

the property which payment became final upon acceptance and

'

delivery of the warranty deed, all of which Appellants later

j

confirmed by voluntarily cashing the cashier's check long
after they had appealed.

I

It is clear from the cases cited in Appellants1
brief that the facts of each case determine whether restitution

•

is proper.

I

In Holmes v. Williams, 273 P.2d 931 (Cal. 1954),

cited by Appellants, the court held that restitution will be
allowed only if it is not inequitable and the parties have
not contracted that payment be final.

In the instant case,

* J
.

all actions, were taken at the direction of Appellants, and

•

the payment was acknowledged by Appellants as "full and

j

complete".

It is submitted that under the facts of this case,
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i

-lithe acts of Appellants were voluntary, payment was final, the
issues are moot, and restitution would be inequitable-

The

principle stated in the Ottenheimer case is applicable to this
case.
Appellants also claim damages for unlawful detainer.
Under no circumstance in the instant case would Appellants
be entitled to damages.

There was nothing in the lower

court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgment in
regard to unlawful detainer.

No issue of unlawful detainer was-

raised in any of the points stated in Appellant's original
brief to this Court.

There was no discussion whatever by

this Court in regard to unlawful detainer in its initial
opinion.

Appellants did not petition for rehearing as to

that matter after the initial decision by this Court was
rendered.

Appellants thus have no basis for claiming such

damages.
£ 2. E C L U £3 !I 0 N
Appellants demanded and received full cash payment from Respondents.

Appellants set the conditions upon

which payment was required and voluntarily cashed the check
and insisted on the party-wall agreement long after filing
their appeal.

It is clear that the issues have been rendered

moot and that Appellants are not equitably entitled to
restitution or damages.

The judgment granted Respondents

should be affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted,
WATKINS & FABER
Walter P. Faber, Jr.
David Lloyd
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered three copies of
the foregoing Brief to Richard W. Perkins, attorney for
Defendants-Appellants, 2525 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this

j <j M

day of September, 1975.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED .
LAW LIBRARYO4 FEE. 1376

to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

